(Archive) Donald Trump speaking at CPAC 2011 in Washington, D.C. (Credit: Gage Skidmore/Flickr)

Fifth and final article in a series about Donald Trump and his voters during 2024 

By Wayne A. Selcher, PhD* [Informe OPEU] [Eleições 2024] [Trump 2.0] 

A Clear and Accepted Winner for the Presidency, but Persistent Polarization 

Quite appropriately, and based on both the national situation and word searches by users of its website dictionary, Merriam-Webster selected “polarization” as its word for the year for 2024, denoting “division into two sharply distinct opposites; especially, a state in which the opinions, beliefs, or interests of a group or society no longer range along a continuum but become concentrated at opposing extremes.” An Associated Press public opinion survey noted the practical significance of the term in the November 2024 election: 

“The election was so divisive, many American voters went to the polls with a feeling that the opposing candidate was an existential threat to the nation. According to AP VoteCast, a survey of more than 120,000 voters, about 8 in 10 Kamala Harris voters were very or somewhat concerned that Donald Trump’s views — but not Harris’ — were too extreme, while about 7 in 10 Trump voters felt the same way about Harris — but not Trump.” 

In accord with that word of the year, the results in the November 2024 popular vote for president were rather closely split, with Donald Trump at 77.303 million (49.8%) and Kamala Harris at 75.019 million (48.3%), but Trump triumphed soundly in the decisive Electoral College, with 312 votes to Harris’ 226. (Results as of January 22, 2025; 270 Electoral College votes are needed for victory.) Trump characteristically claimed an “unprecedented and powerful mandate,” promoting an image of strength to help him overcome resistance to his power in the party and in Washington, and claiming broader public support than he actually has for the radical changes he plans for government and American society. Republican control of both houses of Congress, although with narrow majorities, will tend to facilitate his very transformative policy agenda, at least initially.  

Trump is the first Republican to win the national popular vote since George W. Bush in 2004. Republicans nationwide sensed a major political shift in their favor at the state and local levels, while Democrats were dismayed. In November 2024, Pew Research observed that “for the first time since 2016, more Americans say the Republican Party represents the interests of ‘people like them’ very or somewhat well than say this about the Democratic Party (50% vs. 43%).” Regarding voter attitudes after the election, Gallup summarized in late November 2024: 

“Trump’s reelection is being met with great optimism, relief, excitement and pride from Republicans but fear, anger, devastation and surprise among Democrats. Still, Democrats broadly accept Trump as the legitimate president, even more so than in 2016 when he defeated Hillary Clinton. After the Republican Party’s sweep of the presidency and both chambers of Congress, Americans now view the GOP more favorably than the Democratic Party. However, the gap in favorability stems from a drop in favorable views of the Democratic Party in November rather than an increase in favorable views of the GOP following its victories.” 

The former, more moderate national Republican establishment, including the “never-Trumpers,” and their traditional version of conservatism have been thoroughly smashed and scattered by the Right-wing populists. There is a rising MAGA establishment, totally supportive of Trump and mobilizing Republican politicians in his favor, with “well-funded activist groups and influential media figures.” The Right-wing media sphere, including podcasts, was crucial in his campaign to mobilize voters and has been energized by his victory, describing it as another hard blow to the liberal “legacy media.” Trump’s constant Truth Social posts and those on his X account reach many millions of followers directly and immediately, as did his campaign posts on a YouTube channel. 

Trump’s boasting of uniqueness aside, from a strictly statistical perspective the popular presidential vote difference of 1.5 percent was less than the percentage by which Joe Biden defeated Trump in 2020. Trump’s 2024 Electoral College margin was bettered by Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 and by both of Bill Clinton’s wins in the 1990s. Trump’s margin of victory in the popular vote was “the fifth smallest of the thirty-two presidential races held since 1900.” Further, as of January 24, 2025, public appraisal of Trump averaged 48.2 percent unfavorable and 46.5 percent favorable, illustrating nearly symmetrical polarization. Another measure of the closeness of the election is the fact that the 220-215 seat majority that the Republicans gained in the House of Representatives was enabled by a total of only 7309 votes in three congressional districts (in Iowa, Colorado, and Pennsylvania) out of a total of 148 million votes cast, according to the Cook Political Report.  

Trump’s return to the White House did represent a history-making comeback, because only one other American president was able to win a second but non-consecutive term, Grover Cleveland (elected in 1884 and 1892). After surviving two assassination attempts in 2024 and a criminal conviction on January 10, 2025 (with an unconditional discharge), Trump (at 78) is also the oldest president ever to take office. His age raises appropriate concerns about his physical health and mental acuity and makes his vice-presidential choice of J.D. Vance all the more consequential, including for the future of MAGA. The age gap between Trump and Vance, over 38 years, is the largest between a president and vice-president in U.S. history.  

In thanking his supporters in his victory speech early on November 6, Trump again grandiosely characterized his MAGA movement as “the greatest political movement of all time” and pledged to “turn our country around.” In honor of his achievement, Time magazine named Trump as its “Person of the Year” for 2024, as they did when he was first elected in 2016. In his long Time interview, he referred to his enthusiastic and relentless campaign as “72 Days of Fury” — “There were no days off. There were no timeouts. If you made a mistake, it would be magnified at levels that nobody’s ever seen before.”  

Explaining Trump’s Victory 

There are many angles useful to understanding the context and contours of Trump’s victory. NBC News examined the growing polarization by party in recent decades. Gallup analyzed the public opinion and historical background behind his win. Fox News poll graphics show clearly and insightfully the demographics of support for both Trump and Harris. An NPR analysis looks at the exit poll results by voting shifts according to race, ethnicity, and age, focusing on the swing states. Pew Research set out the voter demographics in general, demonstrated the large differences in values between supporters of the two, assessed the public views of the candidates’ relative strengths and weaknesses in the campaign, and described the beliefs and expectations of Trump supporters. YouGov published a poll survey about public perception of the personality traits of the two candidates. The Economist provided five graphics about county-level results and demographics and an analysis of the effects of various ethnic groups on the vote. The polling organization Morning Consult analyzed various factors in Trump’s win.  

The Washington Post used exit polls to gauge how different groups in society voted and provided some analysis of how educational levels, consumer spending, and reading habits play into the evolution of partisan differences. Gallup offers many perspectives on the campaign and election, including partisan gaps. A pre-election CBS News/YouGov poll examined gender issues and what voters thought about and wanted in the two candidates. Education and religion seem to be eclipsing social class and ethnicity in the demographics of voter opinion and choice, to a significant extent, while they are also contributing to the cultural divides and debates. The 2024 American Values Survey of the Public Religion Research Institute is an excellent overview and analysis of the values, concerns, and issues that influenced voter choice. The Council on Foreign Relations notes some wider historical context and results of the election, including the fact that “The 2024 election was the tenth presidential election in a row in which the margin of victory in the popular vote was in the single digits. That is a record.” Thorough analysis of the campaign, the election, and its consequences by many leading scholars is available in the volume U.S. Election Analysis 2024: Media, Voters and the Campaign.  

A major positive for Trump turned out to be the robust energy and skill of his verbally aggressive, often demagogic and machismo-type populist campaigning. He used the “new media,” sports themes, and “just folks” stunts (like riding in a garbage truck) to relate more closely to his audiences. He emphasized the need for “strong leadership” and being a “fighter,” in contrast to Biden-Harris, whom his campaign painted as weak and out-of-touch but radical and dangerous, “destroying the country.” He campaigned as if he were still an “outsider” or a “non-politician,” speaking in plain language directly to the issues, disillusionment, fear, and anger that mattered to millions of frustrated voters and put the Democrats at a sharp disadvantage. Trump’s message resonated particularly well among historically dominant groups who feel resentment— men, white people, and Christians— who consider themselves patriotic and an important part of society, but now feel discriminated against or disrespected, particularly by liberals, because of their gender, racial, or religious identity and role in society. 

According to Ballotpedia, “The overall turnout of eligible voters in the 2024 general election was 63.7%. This was lower than the 2020 record of 66.6% but higher than every other election year since at least 2004.” The high turnout rate (i.e., where it increased and for whom) may well have favored Trump and the Republicans, contrary to the earlier conventional wisdom that such rates favor Democrats. Trump took all seven decisive “swing states,” the only competitive ones, after losing six of them in 2020.   

His gains in voter support relative to 2020 were national in scope, and notably so among all major minority ethnic groups (especially Hispanic men), young men, white and suburban women, independents, and those less-engaged in politics. The only significant social sector gain that the Democrats made was with white college graduates. A national map of the presidential election results by county shows a sea of red (Republican) with scattered islands of blue (Democrat), with a commemorative poster available. An NBC analysis noted a remarkable performance on Trump’s part: 

“Nationwide, 85.2% of counties voted for Trump. And comparing how each county voted from the 2020 election to 2024, the median vote margin in the country shifted to the right 3.2 percentage points. Key here is that Trump built on his 2020 performance—even in counties he lost—while Vice President Kamala Harris struggled to match President Joe Biden’s 2020 numbers, underperforming in 3 of every 4 counties.” 

Further, as The Economist observed, “Around 90% of American voters live in counties where his vote share increased from 2020. Half live in those where it rose by at least 1.9 percentage points.” There has been a gradual trend toward more conservative views on social and economic issues among the public. It will take another election or two to see if that shift represents some level of persistent voter realignment toward the Republicans, or is just a result of the particular conditions of 2024 and the Trump-Harris matchup. Voter assessment of Trump’s future record in office will be crucial, because his unrealistic campaign promises (such as rapid reduction of grocery prices and a quick end to the war in Ukraine) will not be fulfilled to MAGA expectations and some of his more radical intended policies are likely to impact his own voters negatively, as Elon Musk warned. 

The Shortcomings of Kamala Harris and the Democrats 

Kamala Harris turned out to be a poor fit for 2024’s dominant anti-establishment mood in the electorate, a vice-president from liberal California with a very liberal record who entered the race late, clearly a part of the Biden administration, that was widely unpopular. As of November 5, 2024, an average of only 38.5 percent of the public approved of Biden and 56.3 percent disapproved, while by January 2025, 61 percent saw his term as a failure. In July 2024, after his disastrous performance in a televised debate with Trump, only 24 percent of the public described Biden as “mentally sharp.” Opposition to the current administration was a major motive behind the vote results. Trump was clearly seen as the “change” candidate by voters of both parties, in both positive and negative terms, so Harris had the demanding task of differentiating herself from both Biden and Trump. Although striking an upbeat tone in her short campaign, with a flood of campaign contributions, Harris was far too committed to the policies that a growing number of voters disliked, and could not credibly remake her public image. After being asked in a widely-publicized interview what she would have done differently from Biden, she replied “There is not a thing that comes to mind in terms of—and I’ve been a part of most of the decisions that have had impact.”  

She was not known for effectiveness as vice president (failing to create an image as a capable, innovative, or dynamic leader) and was burdened by identification with consumer price inflation and a major border crisis that became increasingly unpopular as 2024 progressed. The macroeconomic indicators were improving, including as compared to other wealthy countries after the pandemic’s impact, but a high percentage of voters did not feel positive effects in their own lives, in consumer prices (including for food, housing, and cars) and personal debt vs. savings. Her initial focus on “preserving democracy,” health care, and abortion rights did not resonate as effectively in the seven swing state electorates as was anticipated by her campaign. A post-election open-answer poll of swing state voters who chose Trump showed that economic matters and border issues were by far their major concerns, and abortion, health care, and democracy barely registered as relevant issues. Harris also suffered from lower voter turnout in traditionally Democratic areas, compared to Biden’s performance in 2020.  

Democratic strategist James Carville believes that the Democrats’ heavy emphasis in recent years on progressive cultural issues, with an preachy air of moral superiority, such as promoting identity politics, “wokeness,” and DEI initiatives (Diversity, Equity, Inclusion), with controversial and excessive slogans such as “defund the police,” were also definite negatives for many in the public. The party’s recent emphasis on transgender issues such as restroom usage and fussing over using the “proper” personal pronouns for each individual’s gender identity was not a net plus. There was, essentially, a voter rejection of the “Democratic brand” and a further verification of its urban-based elitist estrangement from and cultural disconnect with rural and small town voters and the working class. For millions of Americans in small towns and rural areas, the impression of the quality of governance in the numerous large Democrat-run cities is far from a positive one. 

(Archive) James Carville speaking at the 2016 Politicon at the Pasadena Convention Center in Pasadena, California (Credit: Gage Skidmore/Flickr) 

Perhaps the Democrats’ very manufacturing-oriented understanding of what the “working-class” does for a living and wants is also out of date. (The “working-class” is often defined as those with a high school degree or less in formal education. About 62 percent of the population of age 25 and over does not have a four-year college degree.) Blueprint, a pro-Democratic polling organization, noted that Harris failed to persuade swing voters and summed up her failure as a repudiation in a perceptive post-election report, “Despite Harris’s clear pivot on economic messaging, she couldn’t escape her record, her incumbency, or her party’s reputation. The numbers tell an unforgiving truth: voters didn’t just want Harris to distance herself from Biden’s policies; they wanted Harris to distance herself from what they believe the Democratic Party has become.”  

Monica Potts, a senior politics reporter at ABC News, reviewed extensive polling data on the key issues, including from exit polls. Her thorough and excellent analysis concluded clearly that “Trump won on immigration and the economy, while losing on abortion and democracy… many Americans agreed with his hardline stances on immigration and bought into his message on the economy, while they didn’t necessarily think he would act on his more extreme anti-democratic statements or enact unpopular abortion restrictions.” Harris polled more favorably regarding abortion rights, saving democracy, good personal judgement, and “caring about people like me,” but Trump got considerably higher ratings than Harris on the foreign policy and leadership issues. Many voters who disliked or distrusted Trump were concerned about his authoritarian tendencies and saw him as more extreme than Harris, even as revenge-oriented, but voted for him anyway—“In all, whether voters liked or even trusted Trump didn’t matter as much as the policies and change he represented and the fact that they thought he was ready and able to do the job, regardless of what he said on the campaign trail.” 

Harris may also have been disadvantaged as a woman by a negative belief in the evolving culture that society has become too “soft” or “feminine.” Trump hinted at this stereotype in his campaign by repeatedly emphasizing supposed dangers to society (immigration, crime, inflation, narcotics, election fraud, foreign threats, etc.) and insisting that she and the Democrats were all “too weak” to handle them properly and keep Americans safe. A summary by the Public Religion Research Institute of its large-sample and very useful poll “Challenges to Democracy: The 2024 Election in Focus” found that  

“More than four in ten Americans (43%) agree that society as a whole has become too soft and feminine, a 5-percentage-point decrease from 2023 (48%); a majority of Americans (54%) disagree. Since PRRI first asked this question in 2011, the partisan divide has more than doubled, from 23 percentage points to 57 percentage points. Nearly three-quarters of Republicans (73%) say that society has become too soft and feminine, compared with 42% of independents and only 16% of Democrats.”   

Immigration figured largely in the 2024 election and will continue to be one of the top issues in American politics, because it changes society and reshapes the labor force in major ways. As Pew Research notes, “The U.S. immigrant population has grown sharply over the decades, from 9.6 million in 1970 to 31.1 million in 2000 and almost 48 million in 2023. These totals account for immigrants in the country both legally and illegally. Immigrants make up about 14.3% of the nation’s population, a near-record high.” 

The mounting public opinion changes on immigration during the Biden-Harris administration were particularly negative for Harris. A large portion of the public reacted to the size of the inflow of unauthorized immigrants through the southern border, the scattering of the recent arrivals all over the country, Trump’s rhetoric about that massive unregulated influx as an “invasion,” and his constant portrayal of Harris as Biden’s “failed border czar.” In 2019, a 48-point margin of Republicans agreed with the concept that “an increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups, and nationalities in the U.S.” enriched U.S. culture and society rather than threatened it. In September 2024, 55 percent of Republicans, 11 percent of Democrats, and 32 precent of Independents saw such growing diversity as threatening, all increases from 2019.  

Administration responses came too late and too weak to be convincing, as an estimated 11.3 million unauthorized immigrants remained in the country. In January 2025, an AP-NORC poll found, in an open-ended question format, that about 60 percent of the public, on their own initiative, named immigration as an issue they strongly wanted the government to address, up from about one-third a year earlier. As of January 2025, Gallup noted that controlling illegal immigration was the major policy area in which the most Americans (68 percent) believed that Trump will succeed. 

After the Election: Continuation of Sharp Partisan Differences 

Unlike in 2020, there were no significant post-election disturbances or legal challenges, a positive sign for democracy. However, it should be mentioned that law enforcement and scholars identified the main threat of post-election disturbances in the case of loss as being from the Right, as after the 2020 election. Pew Research noted, as part of a broad survey of voter assessment of the election process, that “American voters overwhelmingly say the 2024 elections across the country and in their own communities were run well this year, and they express high levels of confidence that votes were counted accurately.” After the years-long complaints of “election fraud” in the 2020 election, and still raised by Trump and most Republicans, adherents of that party were satisfied with the fairness and accuracy of the 2024 vote, at least partially because their party won big. But skepticism about the honesty of elections is still active among some Republicans, particularly at the state and local levels. 

Before the election, there was a torrent of misinformation and claims on social media about supposed election fraud. Almost 90 percent of Trump voters saw election fraud as a serious issue before the election, but only about one-third felt that way after the election. As an immediately post-election Reuters/Ipsos poll observed, “In 2020, just 26% of Republican registered voters said the election was legitimate and accurate, compared to 91% now—a 65-point increase.” Nor did the Democrats raise objections in 2024, highlighting how much the thoroughly refuted 2020 “stolen election” fraud claim, and subsequent election fraud claims in general, had to do with Republicans following Trump’s personalistic unwillingness to accept a close loss in 2020, even when one considers the effects of procedural difficulties caused by voting during the pandemic. A 2024 Journal of Marketing study concluded that “In politically polarized situations, Republicans were significantly more willing to convey misinformation than Democrats to gain an advantage over the opposing party.” 

Researchers from the Annenberg School of Communication determined from an unusually large interview database that, although for decades partisan animosity had peaked during election campaigns and then subsided, currently “Partisan animosity appears to be deeply embedded in American society, rather than being a short-term response to electoral campaigns.” Partisanship and animosity continue to condition perception of events, expectations, and the proper role of government. The two contrasting streams of partisan preferences, heroes and villains, information, and analysis persist, as a key part of the national political culture. Every issue, natural disaster, and event gets caught up into a pre-arranged hyper-partisan narrative. In January 2025, Gallup noted that, with regard to the size of the liberal-conservative values gap, “Republicans’ and Democrats’ ideology is the most extreme in 30 years… In 2024, the shares of Republicans identifying as conservative and Democrats identifying as liberal both reached record highs… As partisans have become increasingly polarized ideologically, so too have the candidates elected to public office representing those parties.” Pew Research has documented this tendency in the voting records of members of the U.S. Congress, observing that, in Congress in 2022, “on average, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically today than at any time in the past 50 years.” This extremism hobbles effective government, in favor of “performance politics” and virtue-signaling to one’s constituency. 

Gallup observed in December 2024 that, regarding thirteen major challenges facing the nation in 2025, “Across the 13 dimensions, Republicans’ positive predictions are 30 to 79 percentage points higher than they were two years ago, while Democrats’ are between five and 59 points lower.” An Economist/YouGov poll discovered that regarding consumer confidence about the economy, “the sentiment figure for Democrats is down 27% since the election, whereas the figure for Republicans is up by a whopping 63%.” Partisans consistently tend to be more favorable about the economy when their side is in power, but now “the partisan gap in economic perceptions is bigger than it used to be.” A Monmouth University poll in December 2024 showed major but usual partisan differences on the degree of division within the country at various times, with each party defining national “unity” on their own terms: 

“At the end of Trump’s first term, nearly all Democrats (90%), and close to 3 in 4 independents (73%) said the country grew more divided under Trump, while just under half of Republicans (49%) agreed. This contrasts with current public opinion, where nearly 9 in 10 Republicans (86%) say the country has grown more divided under Biden, while about 6 in 10 independents (62%) and Democrats (56%) feel the same.” 

Partisan differences also extend to what is ultimately at stake in politics and what are considered legitimate actions in a democracy, sometimes in disquieting ways that may come to threaten the established principles and procedures and indicate growing acceptance of the supremacy of partisan advantage and personalistic loyalty to Trump over adherence to constitutional norms. A University of Cambridge study done with YouGov determined that “Almost nine out of ten voters who supported Donald Trump for U.S. President believe that America’s values, traditions and future economic prosperity are under threat – double the number of Kamala Harris supporters.” In his rallies and more regularly, Trump encouraged the view that the United States is failing badly, that there is no objective rule of law, that the then-current federal establishment and American government institutions were “corrupt,” and that everything is just partisan, even the judicial system. He depicts politics not as compromise for mutual benefit based on shared values, but as an urgent and grim zero-sum struggle for the future of the country, in which he presents himself as the divinely-anointed national savior. In his January 20, 2025 Inaugural Address, referring to the two attempts on his life in 2024, Trump stated “I was saved by God to make America great again.”   

Republicans, in accord with Trump, are far more likely than Democrats and Independents to downplay the significance of the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol by Trump supporters and to reject the legitimacy and findings of the subsequent congressional investigation of it. A December 2024 interim report by the Republican-dominated Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on House [of Representatives] Administration heavily criticized the procedures and conclusions of that investigation. In January 2025, Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, announced the creation of a new subcommittee to re-investigate those events of January 6, to further expose “the false narratives peddled by the politically motivated January 6 Select Committee during the 117th Congress,” with the obvious intent to reshape the narrative in ways favorable to Trump and the Republican Party.  

Republicans also tend to believe that the many legal cases brought against Trump were just partisan schemes by the Democrats in which he was an innocent victim of a “witch hunt” by a “corrupt” establishment, not the object of an honest drive for accountability or to “save democracy.” Hence, their opinion of the U.S. Department of Justice has become more critical in recent years. Unfortunately, in a two-party system under polarization, neither party is likely to investigate its own actions, so many attempts at accountability will be headed in some form by the other party, and can therefore be credibly dismissed by many as mere partisan ploys or “talking points” against the investigated side. 

Republicans are much more dismissive of the repeated threats that Trump has made (over 100) to use or to allow the federal government to prosecute a wide variety of his political opponents and those in the justice system who tried to hold him legally accountable. These include the mainstream news media, Google, and the congressional committee that investigated the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol, among many others. Such sharp partisan differences on basic issues, the accepted rules and norms, and understandings of reality, with Trump’s highly disruptive personalistic style now in the White House again, with a full staff of dedicated loyalists, properly raise increasingly serious concerns about national unity, institutional integrity, governance, and the health and future of American democracy.

More from this author at OPEU

Informe OPEU “Trump, MAGA, and the United States Face the November 2024 Presidential Election and Beyond”, 10/10/24 [Portuguese version available here, translated by Wayne Selcher]

Informe OPEU “A Profile of Trump Voters: The Demographics of his MAGA Enthusiasts and Their Relationship to Him”, 9/18/24 [Portuguese version available here, translated by Gabriel Moura and Wayne Selcher]

Informe OPEU “A Profile of Trump Voters: Values and Policy Preferences”, 8/23/24 [Portuguese version available here, translated by Tatiana Teixeira, Post-doctoral researcher (INCT-INEU) and editor of OPEU]

Informe OPEU “The Appeal of Donald J. Trump”, 6/24/24 [Portuguese version available here, translated by Tatiana Teixeira, Post-doctoral researcher (INCT-INEU) and editor of OPEU]

Book review “Eric Hoffer’s ‘The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements’”, 3/11/24 [Portuguese version available here, translated by Andressa Mendes, PhD candidate at San Tiago Dantas International Relations Program (Unesp, Unicamp, PUC-SP), Brazil]

Estudos e Análises “American Political Culture in Transition: The Erosion of Consensus and Democratic Norms”, 2/29/24

Estudos e Análises “Is the United States ‘Exceptional’?”, 8/3/21

Publicity “Virtual Library: The Ultimate Online Research Guide”, 4/26/21

Informe OPEU “Suggested Cost-Free Online Sources for U.S. Politics and Foreign Policy”, 6/2/21

* Wayne A. Selcher, PhD, is Professor of International Studies Emeritus, Department of Political Science, Elizabethtown College, PA, USA, and a regular contributor to OPEU. His major academic interests are Comparative Politics, American society and politics in comparative context, American Foreign Policy, Latin American Politics and Foreign Policy (especially Brazil), and Internet use in international studies teaching and research. He is the creator and editor of the WWW Virtual Library: International Affairs Resources, a web guide for online international studies research in many topics. E-mail: wayneselcher@comcast.net.

** Final review and edit: Tatiana Teixeira. First version received in January 25th, 2025. This content does not necessarily reflect the opinion of OPEU, or INCT-INEU.

*** About OPEU, or to contribute articles, contact editor Tatiana Teixeira. E-mail: tatianat19@hotmail.com. About our Newsletters, for press service, or other matters, contact Tatiana Carlotti. E-mail: tcarlotti@gmail.com.

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